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Abstract This paper examines the relationship between immigration and host countries’ 
institutional quality, using international migration data, and two composite metrics, 
encompassing multiple dimensions of governance. Moreover, we construct indicators of 
cultural diversity, such as fractionalization and polarization, to capture potential effects from 
multiculturalism. To reduce endogeneity concerns, we employ pseudo gravity-based 
instruments in a 2SLS setting. Overall, our findings suggest that counties with higher 
immigrant concentrations and cultural polarization display lower levels of institutional 
quality. Notably, however, the impact on countries with healthy institutions appear to be 
negligible. 
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1 Introduction 
 
There is much agreement among scholars that migrants contribute to the host 
economies by adding their hard work, talents and ideas to the pool of skills (see, e.g., 
Felbermayr et al., 2010; Ortega and Peri, 2014; Alesina et al., 2016; Bove and Elia, 
2017).1 Nevertheless, a recent, bourgeoning area of research suggests that natives in 
many Western countries turn to right-wing extremists in response to immigration 
from abroad (see, e.g., Mendez and Cutillas, 2014; Barone et al., 2016; Halla et al., 
2017; Brunner and Kuhn, 2018; Mayda et al., 2018; Edo et al., 2019; Roupakias and 
Chletsos, 2020). As summarized by Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014), existing 
research on native attitudes toward migrants suggests that anti-immigration 
sentiments are mainly fueled by sociotropic concerns about the potential impacts on 
a nation’s cultural homogeneity rather by economic considerations.2 
There is, however, one open question, concerning the effects of migrants on the 
quality of institutions, which has long been recognized by economists that is amongst 
the most crucial determinants of economic development (see, e.g., Olson, 1982; 
North, 1990; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001; 
Rodrik et al., 2004).3 Some prominent scholars, such as Collier (2013) and Borjas 
(2015), appear to be pessimistic, raising concerns that migrants might import “bad” 
institutions into the receiving countries. Yet, the few existing empirical studies have 
documented mixed results on some indicators related to the quality of governance, 
such as economic freedom, corruption and political stability (see, Mavisakalyan and 
Gebremedhin, 2013; Clark et al., 2015; Dimant et al., 2015; Powell et al., 2017; 
Padilla and Cachanosky, 2018; Bologna Pavlik et al., 2019). The main message 
conveyed by these studies is that immigration is strongly associated with higher 
levels of economic freedom across countries,4 whereas it induces political instability. 
 
1
 Banerjee and Duflo (2019) offer a nice discussion of the literature on the economic impacts of 
migration. 
2
 Sides and Citrin (2007) also argue that native attitudes reflect misperceptions about the true size of 
immigrant population and stereotypes, rather than economic concerns. 
3
 However, note that not all economists agree that healthy political institutions induce economic 
prosperity. For instance, Clark (2005) argues that the establishment of a stable democracy after the 1688-
1669 Glorious Revolution in the UK, did not coincide with economic growth. See, also the objections 
raised by the institutional economist, Chang (2011), related to identification issues surrounding the 
empirical literature based on observational data. 
4
 Padilla and Cachanosky (2018), employing state-level data for the USA find a weak negative 
association between immigration and economic freedom. 
 2 
 
On the other hand, the evidence is mixed concerning the impact of immigration on 
corruption. For instance, Dimant et al. (2015) have suggested that migration exhibits 
a positive association with corruption in OECD countries,5  whereas Bologna Pavlik 
et al. (2019) have argued that the effect is negligible.6 
The aim of this paper is to shine new light on these debates, by systematically 
examining the nexus between immigration and institutional quality, as proxied by the 
mean value of the World Governance Indicators (WGI) for six dimensions of 
governance, namely voice and accountability, political stability and lack of violence, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010). We also perform robustness checks by employing an 
alternative synthetic metric in the fashion of Jones and Tarp (2016), combining data 
from the Freedom House, the Database of Political Institutions, the CIRI Human 
Rights Dataset, the Polity IV project, and Wood and Gibney’s (2010) dataset. We are 
unaware of any similar attempt to assess whether migration is associated with the 
quality of governance, as measured by the composite indicators employed in this 
study. What is more, given the strong association between institutions and economic 
development, having greater insight into the connection between migration and 
institutions would yield useful information about the impact of migrants on economic 
development as well.  
A secondary objective of this study is to assess the role of multiculturalism, 
measured along two dimensions, namely fractionalization and polarization (see, e.g., 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005).7 The relevant indicators are constructed using 
data from the World Bank’s Global Bilateral Migration Matrices, and are intended  
to capture the effects of immigration induced heterogeneity, as opposed to the 
immigrant share which reflects the scale of the migration phenomenon. Lastly, our 
study also contributes to the literature analyzing the determinants of institutions (see 
e.g., Alesina et al., 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Nunn 
and Puga, 2012; Alesina and Giuliano, 2015; Rubin, 2017; Ang et al., 2018).8  
 
5
 More precisely, these authors find that the effects stem from migrants originating from countries which 
display high levels of corruption and not from general immigration per se.  
6
 It is worth noting, that a number of related studies have been undertaken to explore the nexus between 
the current institutional development and the pre-modern migrations (see, for instance, Putterman and 
Weill, 2010; Ang, 2013). 
7
 Concerning the economic impact of multiculturalism, the literature, as summarized in Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol (2020), reveals negative effects at low levels of aggregation (i.e., at the country level), 
while the opposite holds true at high levels of aggregation (i.e., at cities within a single country). 
8
 For instance, Acemoglu et al.’s (2001) influential paper puts emphasis on disease environment, which 
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However, the fact that the allocation of migrants across countries is unlikely to be 
random (i.e., migrants tend to cluster into states, which display higher levels of 
economic and institutional development) is a well-known identification issue in the 
literature. To mitigate endogeneity concerns, we build instruments relying on a 
pseudo-gravity model of bilateral migrations, recently popularized by Mayda (2010) 
and Grogger and Hanson (2011). Several empirical studies have thereafter adopted 
this approach, in order to mitigate endogeneity concerns (see, e.g., Felbermayr et al., 
2010; Mavisakalyan, 2011; Gebremedhin and Mavisakalyan, 2013; Ortega and Peri, 
2014; Aleksynska and Tritah, 2015; Alesina et al., 2016). The rationale behind this 
approach is straightforward. The resulting fitted values from the gravity type 
regressions serve as a source of exogenous variation for the observed immigrant 
shares, since they are evaluated on the basis of geographic variables.  
Overall, our findings corroborate with the idea that immigration is negatively 
associated with institutions. More precisely, our IV estimates suggest that a standard 
deviation increase in the immigrant share reduces our institutional proxies by about 
0.35 and 0.7 standard deviations, respectively. Notably, however, our analysis 
indicates that the effects are mainly driven by non-OECD countries. By contrast, the 
institutional consequences of immigration appear to be negligible for the case of 
OECD member countries. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses potential 
underlying theoretical mechanisms through which immigration may affect 
institutions. In Section 3 we present the data and the empirical model used to identify 
the relationship between the variables under scrutiny. Section 4 presents the 
empirical findings, focusing on the 2SLS estimates; and performs a battery of 
robustness checks. Finally, Section 5 concludes.  
 
2 Channels 
 
In principle, the association between immigration and host countries’ institutional 
quality is a priori indeterminate, since there are multiple mechanisms which work at 
opposite directions. The simplest one is the direct diffusion of source country 
institutions at destinations, as suggested by Collier (2013); Borjas (2015); Dimant et 
 
encouraged Europeans to establish extractive institutions into colonies which were displaying high 
settlement mortality.  
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al. (2015). The effect (if any) could be either positive or negative, depending on the 
level of institutional development prevailing at both source and host countries. That 
is, not only immigrant characteristics, but also destination country’s characteristics 
play a crucial role in determining whether institutions are affected by the presence of 
foreigners (Pavlik et al., 2019). However, one would expect a diminishing effect on 
institutions as time goes by, insofar as immigrants become accustomed to the 
receiving country’s social norms and values. Dimant et al. (2015), employing data 
from OECD member countries over the period 1984-2008, suggest that there is a 
positive association between migrants (mainly from source countries which display 
high levels of corruption) and perceived corruption in the host countries. By contrast, 
Pavlik et al. (2019), adopting a long-run perspective, find no evidence that 
immigration increases corruption, using a sample of 110 countries. Instead, the 
author provides some evidence that immigrants make advanced countries better off 
in terms of corruption. 
A second potential mechanism pertains to perceptions and stereotypes about 
populations stemming from different countries and their effects on social trust. 
Several scholars have suggested that increased ethnic heterogeneity may reduce both 
inter- and intra- groups social trust (see e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Costa and 
Kahn, 2007; Putnam, 2007). In turn, social trust has been consistently shown that 
displays strong positive association with several political economy outcomes (see 
e.g., Putnam, 2007; Bjørnskov, 2010). Hence, immigration may undermine the 
overall quality of governance through the social trust channel. Immigration is also 
argued to affect institutions through its impact on the size of government, 9 which 
according to Alesina and Angeletos (2005) is associated with higher levels of 
corruption and rent-seeking. On the other hand, as suggested by the empirical 
findings reported in Kotera et al. (2012), the nexus between the size of government 
and the quality of governance depends on the stage of democratic development.  
Immigration could also affect institutions through its impact on the election 
outcomes. For instance, in many Western states, there is much evidence that natives 
express their fears about immigration in the ballot box, by voting populist and far-
 
9
 Empirical studies usually report a negative effect of immigration on the size of government through its 
impact on preferences for redistribution and the provision of public goods (see e.g., Alesina et al., 2001; 
Razin et al., 2002; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). A notable exception is Gerdes (2011), who, using data 
from Danish municipalities over the 1995-2001 period, finds no evidence that ethnic heterogeneity 
reduces the size of the public sector.  
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right parties (see e.g., Mendez and Cutillas, 2014; Barone et al., 2016; Halla et al., 
2017; Brunner and Kuhn, 2018; Edo et al., 2019; Roupakias and Chletsos, 2020), 
which, in turn, could severely damage both economic and political institutions. In 
addition, some other studies report direct evidence, consistent with the idea that 
immigration and diversity induce political instability (see, for instance, Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol, 2005; Gebremedhin and Mavisakalyan, 2013). 
Based on the above theoretical considerations, the following testable hypotheses 
can be formulated: 
H1: Immigration impacts institutions; however, the sign pattern of the coefficient 
on the immigrant share variable is ambiguous.  
H2: There is no significant correlation between immigration and institutions. 
 
 
3 Model and Data 
 
Following common practice in the related immigration literature (see, e.g., Ortega 
and Peri, 2014; Gebremedhin and Mavisakalyan, 2013; Clark et al., 2015; Alesina et 
al., 2016), we analyze the connection between immigration and the quality of 
institutions, relying on a cross-sectional design, regressing institutions, averaged 
over the 2006-2015 period, on migrations and other covariates, averaged over the 
1990-2000 period. Such a design may be also beneficial insofar as it eliminates 
contemporaneous correlation between the variables under scrutiny.10 To mitigate 
omitted bias concerns, we add to our empirical specification a rich set of covariates 
(which we discuss analytically at the end of this section), following closely the model 
put forward by Jones and Tarp (2016).11 Hence, our empirical specification can be 
stated formally as follows: 
 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑄𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑖 + 𝛾′𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖         (1) 
 
 
10
 What is more, as discussed in Gebremedhin and Mavisakalyan (2013), identification through an 
instrumental variables panel-data setting is infeasible, since gravity-based instruments display limited 
variation over time. As a consequence, a 2SLS approach can mostly be used with cross-sectional data.  
11
 Please, notice, that we consider the additional controls as a means to improve identification concerning 
our key independent variable, and generally we abstain from interpreting their estimates due to potential 
reverse causality issues. 
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where INSTQ stands for our metrics (described below in this section) used to 
evaluate the institutional performance of the countries analyzed in this study, IMM 
stands for our key independent variable of interest, namely the immigrant share, and 
Z is the matrix of further covariates. 
However, as it is well-known in the literature, analyzing correlations between 
immigration and several host countries’ indicators could be problematic mainly for 
three reasons. First, migrant’s location decisions are usually endogenous, since 
migrants tend to settle into areas displaying high levels of development. We cannot 
also rule out the possibility of severe measurement errors due to undocumented 
immigration, which is related to the so-called attenuation bias (see, e.g., Aydemir and 
Borjas, 2011). Third, cross-country correlations might be spurious, as long as there 
are unobserved confounders which are associated simultaneously with both the 
dependent variable and the main regressor of interest. To minimize the risks of 
obtaining spurious correlations, we pursue a 2SLS approach, employing 
geographically determined migrations as an instrument, predicted by means of a 
pseudo-gravity regression of dyadic migrant flows.12 Our gravity model is 
straightforward and has already been used extensively in the literature (see, e.g., 
Ortega and Peri, 2014; Alesina et al., 2016). More precisely, we model bilateral 
migration as a function of the 1960 population at destinations, bilateral distance 
between sending and host countries, contiguity, common language, colonial ties and 
time zone differences. We also introduce to our gravity model country of origin and 
period fixed effects to mitigate “multilateral resistance” concerns, as originally put 
forward by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).13 As a check of robustness, we 
estimate the model with OLS, as in Frankel and Rose (2002), as well as with the 
pseudo-Poisson maximum likelihood (PPML) method suggested by Santos Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006). However, despite OLS’s popularity, it is less suited to this specific 
setting, since the PPML estimator deals with zero values in the dependent variable 
(see, e.g., Ortega and Peri, 2014). We, therefore, consider the latter as our preferable 
specification.14 
 
12
 We, nevertheless, prefer not giving a causal interpretation to our results, since we cannot account for 
unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity in our cross-country regressions. 
13
 We refer to the confounding effects of the attractiveness of other destinations, beyond the pair of the 
origin and the destination country considered (see, e.g., Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2013). 
14
 Using Monte Carlo simulations, these authors have shown that the PPML estimator outperforms the 
OLS log linear model. 
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The research data in this paper is drawn from several sources. Data on the quality 
of institutions comes from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project, 
developed by Kaufmann et al. (2010). In particular, we employ the mean value 
(divided by 100, as in Ang et al., 2018) of the perceptions‐based indicators of 
governance, namely Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, 
and Control of Corruption. In addition, we employ an alternative proxy for the 
institutional quality inspired by Jones and Tarp (2016), and computed as the mean 
value of Freedom House’s political rights and civil liberty indicators, Polity IV’s 
polity2 index and executive constraints, Database of Political Institutions’ checks and 
balances, Wood and Gibney’s (2010) political terror, and CIRI’s judicial 
independence.15 Before averaging, these indicators were standardized, whilst 
political terror was rescaled as well, so as a higher score to indicate better 
governance. Our main independent variable of interest, the ratio of immigrant to total 
population, was obtained from World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(available at: datatopics.worldbank.org-/world-development-indicators/).  
Our most parsimonious specification is similar to the one put forward by Jones and 
Tarp (2016) and includes the level of economic development, as proxied by income 
per person; openness to trade, i.e., the ratio of imports and exports relative to gdp; 
the size of government, that is, government spending normalized by gdp; life 
expectancy at birth; population; the degree of urbanization; population per square 
km; and a dummy variable indicating whether the country is considered as an oil/gas 
exporter. In further sensitivity analysis, we expand the set of explanatory variables 
by adding some widely-used geographical controls, such as distance to the equator; 
the percent of tropical land area and a landlocked dummy indicator. Distance to 
equator and tropical land area are intended to capture Western influence, related to 
the Europeans settlement patterns during the 1500s, based on climate and disease 
environment (see, e.g., Diamond, 1998; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 
2001). On the other hand, landlockedness is usually correlated with lower levels of 
trade and development (see, e.g., Frankel and Rose, 2002). Lastly, our preferred 
specification incorporates colonial dummies for “neo-Europes” (namely USA, 
 
15
 Please note that the relevant indicators used to construct our second proxy for institutions were 
downloaded from the Quality of Government (QoG) database, available at: https://qog.pol.gu.se/data. 
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Australia, Canada and New Zealand), former British and French colonies (La Porta 
et al., 2008), as well as continent fixed effects to account for broad differences across 
countries.16 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
For our pseudo-gravity model, we use data from two sources. Dyadic migrant 
stocks for the period from 2000 to 2010 come from the World Bank’s Bilateral 
Migration Matrices (available at: https://www-.worldbank.org/en/topic/migration-
remittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data). The remaining controls 
were obtained from the CEPII gravity database (available at: http://www.cepii-
.fr/cepii-/en/bdd_modele-/download.asp?id=8). 
 
4 Results 
In this section, we summarize and discuss the main findings concerning the impact 
of migrants on the quality of institutions. These results were obtained using the 
methods outlined in section 3. Our basic proxy for institutions is the metric obtained 
from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (labeled as INSTQ1), while we also run 
regressions with an alternative composite index, calculated with data from the 
Quality of Government dataset (labeled as INSTQ2), as a robustness check. Lastly, 
we conduct a battery of sensitivity tests, to assess the validity of our baseline 
estimations to outlying observations and the inclusion of further controls.   
Due to the usual endogeneity and measurement error concerns, we focus on the 
evidence produced through our 2SLS strategy. We employ as an instrument the fitted 
values (aggregated at the destination country level) from the gravity model of 
bilateral migrations flows, the estimates of which are reported in Table 2. As can 
easily be verified, the results appear to be quite stable across specifications and bear 
the expected sign, while the overall fit of the model is quite high. In congruence with 
Alesina et al. (2016), we opt to build our instrument using the estimates from the last 
specification, which excludes the 1960 population at destination, in order to 
minimize the risk of not meeting the exclusion restriction.  
 
16
 Variables, sources and preliminary statistical information are summarized in Table 1. A visual 
illustration of the main variables of interest is shown in the Appendix Figure 1. 
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
The first set of second-stage empirical results is shown in Table 3. Since our 
approach entails cluster robust standard errors, the Kleibergen–Paap (KP) test is used 
to evaluate whether our instrument is a robust predictor of contemporaneous 
immigrant shares.17 As can easily be verified, our gravity approach has returned very 
encouraging results, since the KP test always displays a value above the rule of thumb 
of 10.  
Overall, the coefficients on the immigrant share variable are more precisely 
estimated when employing the synthetic metric INSTQ2 as the dependent variable. 
This, however, is hardly surprising, since INSTQ1 displays much greater variation 
as compared to INSTQ2 (see Table 1). Specification 1 suggests that immigrants 
exhibit a negative but insignificant effect on institutions, as proxied by the World 
Bank’s indicator. More precisely, the second column expands the set of covariates 
by adding further geographical variables, whereas the third column adds former 
colonial dummies and continent-specific fixed effects. Notice, however, that the 
estimated coefficient of interest shows up much stronger, both in terms of magnitude 
and statistical significance, as it becomes significant at the p=0.1 and p=0.05 levels, 
respectively. The estimated coefficient on the immigrant share variable implies that 
a one percent increase in immigration lowers the quality of institutions by about 0.7 
and 0.9 points, respectively. In the remaining specifications, we test the sensitivity 
of our previous findings by employing our alternative institutional indicator as the 
dependent variable. Importantly, there is a similar pattern of association, since 
immigration enters with a negative, and significant coefficient through columns 4 
and 6.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
In Table 4, we attempt to quantify the relationship between immigration and the 
institutional quality of countries analyzed in this study, by means of the standardized 
beta coefficients. The results correspond to the specifications reported in columns 3 
 
17
 The first stage coefficients on the gravity-based instrument (not shown, available upon request) always 
enter positively and significantly at the conventional levels of significance.  
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and 6 of Table 3. We observe that a standard deviation increase in the ratio of 
immigrants to total population reduces our WGI composite indicator of interest by 
about 0.36 standard deviations. On the other hand, it appears that the magnitude of 
the estimated coefficient of interest becomes stronger when considering our 
alternative indicator of institutional quality (i.e., 0.7). Concerning the associations 
between the remaining control variables and institutions, the results appear to make 
sense and to be compatible with our expectations. More precisely, the evidence 
suggests that income per person is among the most significant predictors of 
institutions across countries, lending support to Lipset’s (1959) law that income per 
capita is positively associated with the quality of governance. What is more, there is 
a considerable negative association between the oil/gas exporter indicator and the 
quality of institutions. This corroborates with the findings of the so-called resource 
curse literature, which is nicely summarized in Vahabi (2018). It is also unsurprising 
to find that population and urbanization display positive correlations with 
institutions. Lastly, it is also evident that some geographic indicators explain large 
part of cross-country differences in the quality of institutions.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
In Figure 1, we perform a heterogeneity analysis, in order to test whether the 
effects of immigration are different between OECD member states and non-OECD 
countries. This choice is motivated by Collier (2000; 2001) who contend that ethnic 
diversity is mostly problematic in countries with weaker political institutions. In line 
with previous immigration literature (see, e.g., D’Amuri and Peri, 2014), we modify 
our model by introducing the interaction between immigration and two dummies 
indicating OECD and non-OECD status, respectively, whereas similar interactions 
are considered for the instrumental variables.18 In line with the Collier’s argument, 
the coefficients on the interaction term immigration*OECD appear to be significant 
and much stronger than the ones of the immigration*non-OECD term. The latter 
enters with a marginally significant coefficient only when our second indicator for 
institutional quality is considered. 
 
18
 The results remain qualitatively similar when all the constitutive terms (i.e., immigration, the OECD 
indicator and their interaction) are included in the regression as suggested by Brambor et al., 2006). 
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[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
 
Next, further analysis was done to see whether our main results withstand the 
inclusion of further controls. Panel A of table 5 uses the WGI-based proxy as the 
dependent variable, whilst panel B uses the QoG-based indicator. In specification 1 
we add average years of schooling, motivated by Boix (2003) who suggests that 
education and democracy are closely related.19 The second column, pays attention to 
the so called “deep roots” literature, by adding the immigrant share in 1500 as 
suggested by Putterman and Weill (2010).20 By the same token, column 3 introduces 
into the model population density in 1500, as a proxy for early development.21 
Specification 4 introduces the 1900 percentage of Protestants, Catholics and 
Muslims, respectively.22 Lastly, specification 5 introduces the above covariates 
simultaneously. Importantly, a comparison of the results obtained from these 
experiments with the ones we found in our main specification, strengthens our 
confidence on the robustness of our previous conclusion that migration displays a 
negative and significant correlation with the quality of governance. However, the 
results in the last two specifications become weaker and lose significance at the 
conventional levels. We note, however, that these findings should be cautiously 
interpreted, since the first-stage F test falls below the threshold of 10, and, thus might 
suffer from weak identification issues. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
In Table 6, we move beyond the mean effects reported above, by estimating the 
impact of immigration on each dimension of governance separately. This is important 
to determine whether our main finding that immigration deteriorates institutional 
quality is driven by a particular sub-indicator. As it is apparent from this table, the 
coefficient on the immigrant share variable appears to be always negative and 
 
19
 We have also performed robustness checks to the inclusion of alternative measures for openness, such 
as the Alcalá and Ciccone’s (2004) real trade openness, the KOF aggregate globalization index and its 
sub-components, that is, economic, social and political globalization. The results from this empirical 
exercise (not shown, available upon request) are qualitatively similar to the ones we present in the main 
text. 
20
 This variable was taken from the work of Ortega and Peri (2014). 
21
 The rationale for the inclusion of population density in 1500 is discussed in a wider context in Ang 
(2013) and Ang et al. (2018). 
22
 These variables were downloaded from McCleary and Barro (2006). 
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significant at conventional levels, through most specifications. Hence, the results are 
reassuring concerning the association between migration and the quality of 
governance. It could be argued, however, that the effects of immigration are 
multidimensional rather been determined by a single indicator. Interestingly, the 
findings concerning political instability and corruption corroborate the ones 
previously reported by Mavisakalyan and Gebremedhin (2013) and Dimant et al. 
(2015), respectively.  
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Next, an important empirical exercise involves an experiment à la Coates et al. 
(2010), in order to ascertain whether our findings are driven by outlying observations. 
More precisely, we estimate our full specification 1000 times, randomly eliminating 
10% of observations at a time from the sample. The visual representation of the 
results obtained following the above approach can be seen in Figure 2. This figure 
illustrates the estimated coefficients of interest, and the corresponding confidence 
intervals. As it is apparent, the immigrant share variable enters always with a 
negative coefficient, signifying that our findings are unlikely to be influenced by 
particular observations. Importantly, the estimates are always significant, at least at 
the 10 percent level.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
Lastly, we re-estimate our main specification by including fractionalization and 
polarization indices as regressors, in order to assess whether immigration-induced 
diversity drives the effects reported previously. Our fractionalization indicator is akin 
to the one employed in Alesina et al. (2016); Akay et al. (2017) and is computed as 
follows: 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑡 = 1 −∑(𝜋𝑗𝑐)2𝑗≠𝑐  
where 𝜋𝑗𝑐 designates the share of migrants from country 𝑗 to country c. This index 
indicates the probability that two randomly drawn migrants stem from different 
countries. A zero index indicates a perfectly homogeneous immigrant population in 
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terms of origin. At the other end of the spectrum, a value of one implies that each 
migrant comes from a different country. Importantly, our fractionalization indicator is 
highly correlated (0.82) with the one constructed by Alesina et al. (2016) for the years 
1990 and 2000.  
However, a related strand of the literature, emphasizes that it is important to 
distinguish between cultural pluralism and cultural polarization, since the latter better 
captures potential social conflicts (see e.g., Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Ager 
and Brückner, 2013). To account for this possibility, we alternatively measure 
diversity using the polarization index, which is computed as follows (see, e.g., 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Bove and Elia, 2016): 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑡 = 1 −∑(0.5 − 𝜋𝑗𝑐)2𝜋𝑐𝑗0.25𝑗≠𝑐  
where 𝜋𝑗𝑐 is defined in an analogous way as in our fractionalization indicator.23 A 
value of one indicates that there two equally sized origin groups. 
In Table 7, we proceed by showing three sets of empirical 2SLS estimates. The 
first set is based on the immigrant share variable and the fractionalization indicator. 
The second, substitutes polarization for fractionalization, whereas the third uses both 
diversity indicators simultaneously whilst omitting the immigrant share variable.24 
Notice, however, that the applicability of the gravity-based instrumental variables 
regression is not always possible. Unfortunately, an assessment of the instruments 
we attempted to generate yielded no statistically significant correlations with our 
potentially endogenous indicators of diversity.25 We, therefore, have followed an 
intermediate solution, building conventional “shift-share” instruments for 
fractionalization and polarization, using the 1980 migrant shares by country of origin 
and the contemporaneous nationwide stocks of migrants (see, e.g., Card, 2001).26  
 
23
 Interestingly, a preliminary examination of the data in Appendix Figure 2, suggests that there is a 
strong positive correlation between our two indicators, at least up to a certain point, which becomes 
negative at high levels of fractionalization. It is also important to highlight that similar patterns emerge 
in scatterplots presented in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005, p. 307); Ager and Brückner (2013, p. 
81); Bove and Elia (2016, p. 4). 
24
 Similar models are also estimated in Montalvo and and Reynal-Querol (2005). 
25
 A similar issue also arises in Ortega and Peri (2014) 
26
 The rationale is that migrant networks play a significant role in the settlement patterns of new 
immigrants (see, e.g., Bartel, 1989). We omit the technical details on the construction of the shift-share 
instruments for brevity, and refer the interested reader to Card (2001). Please, also note, that the results 
of this empirical exercise should be interpreted with caution, since we cannot exclude the possibility that 
the imputed migrant stocks are fully exogenous (see Orefice and Santoni, 2018). 
 14 
 
As can be easily seen, two patterns emerge from the results summarized in Table 
7. On the one hand, our fractionalization indicator enters with a positive coefficient 
through specifications, though statistically different from zero only in the first 
column. On the other hand, polarization appears to be correlated with lower quality 
of institutions across specifications. On balance, we interpret the evidence as 
suggestive that immigration induced polarization is the main channel through which 
immigration adversely affects the quality of institutions in the countries under 
scrutiny. 
 
5 Conclusion 
This paper places under scrutiny the effects of immigration and multiculturalism on 
institutional quality, as proxied by the composite metric, constructed using data from 
the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators and the one built by employing 
information from the Quality of Government database. As migrants usually tend to 
locate into regions endogenously (i.e., they might prefer to settle into developed 
states), we pursue an instrumental variables approach, fitting pseudo-gravity 
equations of bilateral migrations to obtain the exogenous component of immigration, 
attributed to geographical determinants. This study design seems to be advantageous 
compared with the majority of related existing work.27 To mitigate omitted variables 
bias concerns, we employ an extensive set of controls which are considered amongst 
the most important drivers of institutions.  
Analyzing a sample of 130 countries, our 2SLS estimates indicate that migration 
and the quality of governance exhibit a robust negative and significant association.28 
This finding survives the inclusion of further controls and holds true for both the 
alternative proxies of institutional quality used in this study. It also appears not to be 
driven by outlying observations. When looking at the effects of multiculturalism, as 
proxied by our cultural fractionalization and polarization indices, we find 
correlations of the opposite sign, in congruence with Montalvo and Reynal-Querol’s 
(2005b) contention, that polarization is more relevant when exploring issues related 
to social tensions. We have also explored whether the impact of immigration differs 
 
27
 One notable exception is, of course, Mavisakalyan and Gebremedhin (2013) who also rely on a 2SLS 
approach to address potential endogeneity.  
28
 Our results for sub-components of the metrics analyze in this study are in line with Mavisakalyan and 
Gebremedhin (2013) and Dimant et al. (2015), who suggest that migration causes political instability and 
corruption to increase. 
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between OECD member states and non-OECD countries, inspired by Collier’s (2000, 
2001) argument that the level of institutional development into the host countries 
matters when analyzing immigration impacts. Interestingly, the message conveyed 
by this heterogeneity test, is that the finding that immigration is negatively correlated 
with institutional quality is mainly driven by the sample of non-OECD countries.  
The results of the present study add to the growing body of empirical cross-country 
analyses on the effects of immigration on development. On balance, the results 
cannot be claimed to be consistent with Borjas’s (2015) arguements, since 
institutions in the more advanced states do not appear to be dramatically affected by 
migrants. Despite the limitations of the cross-sectional design, the findings of this 
study are important and contribute to our understanding on the relationship between 
immigration and economic development as well, through the quality of institutions 
channel. As more data will be available, further research should be carried out to 
examine this issue, especially by means of conventional panel data techniques. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
Obs Mean S.D. Min Max Definition  Source 
INSTQ1 130 0.48 0.27 0.07 0.98 Average of six broad dimensions of governance,  World Government Indicators 
      
namely, corruption, effectiveness, stability, regulatory  
quality, rule of law, voice accountability 
 
Corruption 130 0.47 0.29 0.03 1 Captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is  World Government Indicators 
      
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms  
 
      
of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and  
 
      
private interests.  
 
Effectiveness 130 0.5 0.28 0.03 0.99 Captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality  World Government Indicators 
      
of the civil service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies 
 
Stability 130 0.44 0.26 0.01 0.98 Measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability  World Government Indicators 
      
and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism 
 
Regulatory 130 0.51 0.28 0.01 0.99 Captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate  World Government Indicators 
      
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit  
 
      
and promote private sector development 
 
Rule of law 130 0.48 0.29 0.02 0.99 Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have  World Government Indicators 
      
Confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, 
 
      
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence 
 
Voice & Accountability 130 0.48 0.29 0.01 1 Captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are  World Government Indicators 
      
able to participate in selecting their government, as well as 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. 
 
INSTQ2 127 0 0.06 -0.15 0.12 Average of standardized indicators capturing judicial, Quality of Government 
      
independence checks and balances, democracy, political terror and 
executive constraint 
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Judicial Independence 127 -0.04 0.1 -0.14 0.11 
Indicates the extent to which the judiciary is independent of 
control from other sources, such as another branch of the 
government or the military 
 
Quality of Government 
Checks 127 0.01 0.08 -0.11 0.38 The number of veto players over political decision 
 
Democracy 127 0 0.09 -0.19 0.11 
Average of Freedom House (civil liberties and political rights)  
and Polity (polity2) transformed to a scale 0-10.  Quality of Government 
Political terror 
(rescaled) 127 -0.01 0.09 -0.18 0.12 
Indicates  levels of abuse, political terror, or physical integrity 
rights  
  
Executive constraint 127 0.01 0.05 -0.25 0.03 
Refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision  
making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or 
collectivities. 
 
Immigrant share 130 0.07 0.1 0 0.66 Share of migrants over total population 
World Bank Development 
Indicators 
Fractionalization 
     
Probability that two randomly drawn individuals were born in  
Own calculations on World 
Bank’s  
      
different countries.  Bilateral Migration Matrices 
Polarization 
     
Index that captures how far the distribution of the  
Own calculations on World 
Bank’s  
      
ethnic groups is from a bipolar distribution  Bilateral Migration Matrices 
GDP/capita 130 8.18 1.55 5.46 11.25 Gross Domestic Product per person ($2010) 
World Bank Development 
Indicators 
Trade openness  130 70.49 34.67 18.11 213.91 Exports+Imports normalized by GDP 
World Bank Development 
Indicators 
Government size 130 16.08 6.21 1.48 41.37 Government expenditure divided by GDP 
World Bank Development 
Indicators 
Life expectancy 130 65.52 10.24 35.32 79.85 Life expectancy at birth 
World Bank Development 
Indicators 
Population 130 16.13 1.54 12.26 20.91 Total population (logged) 
World Bank Development 
Indicators 
Urbanization 130 53.12 23.02 7.23 98.32 Share of population leaving in urban areas 
World Bank Development 
Indicators 
Density 130 90.55 
117.2
1 1.48 885.8 Population per sq. km of land area 
World Bank Development 
Indicators 
Oil/gas exporter 130 0.25 0.34 0 0.8 Dummy variable indicating positive oil or gas net exports. Quality of Government 
 23 
 
Distance to equator 130 28.33 17.93 0.42 67.47 Distance to equator (in degrees) Ortega and Peri (2014) 
% Tropic land 130 0.46 0.48 0 1 The percentage of land in the tropics Ortega and Peri (2014) 
Landlocked 130 0.22 0.41 0 1 Dummy variable for landlockedness BACI database 
Years of schooling 115 6.59 3.03 0.85 12.65 Average years of schooling for population aged 25 and above Barro and Lee (2013) 
% of Immigrants in 
1500 130 0.26 0.32 0 1 Share of immigrants in 1500 Putterman and Weil (2010) 
Population density in 
1500 128 1.08 1.69 -3.83 5.64 Population per sq. km of land area in 1500 Ortega and Peri (2014) 
% of Catholics in 1900 130 0.27 0.39 0 1 Share of Catholics over total population in 1900 McCleary and Barro (2006) 
% of Protestants in 1900 130 0.11 0.25 0 1 Share of Protestants over total population in 1900 McCleary and Barro (2006) 
% of Muslims in 1900 130 0.21 0.36 0 1 Share of Muslims over total population in 1900 McCleary and Barro (2006) 
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Table 2 Gravity estimates of bilateral migrations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimator OLS OLS PPML PPML 
Dependent variable ln(Mij) ln(Mij) Mij Mij 
Population at destination in 
1960 -0.466*** 
 
-1.68e-08* 
 
 
(0.0760) 
 
(9.98e-09) 
 
Bilateral distance -1.472*** -1.579*** -0.000564*** -0.000539*** 
 
(0.175) (0.176) (8.53e-05) (8.13e-05) 
Colonial relationship 2.607*** 1.964*** 1.130*** 0.976*** 
 
(0.276) (0.230) (0.201) (0.163) 
Common ethnic language 0.964*** 1.085*** 0.753*** 0.716*** 
 
(0.300) (0.287) (0.248) (0.259) 
Common official language 0.319 0.619** 1.039*** 1.105*** 
 
(0.215) (0.252) (0.222) (0.227) 
Common border 1.807*** 1.047** 0.833*** 0.722*** 
 
(0.346) (0.464) (0.218) (0.234) 
Time zone difference 0.252* 0.181 0.225*** 0.177*** 
 
(0.135) (0.133) (0.0620) (0.0561) 
Observations 29,909 29,995 70,996 71,166 
Adjusted R-squared 0.419 0.325 0.302 0.272 
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by destination country. All Models include 
period and period by country of origin fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3 Immigration and institutional quality, 2SLS estimates 
Dependent variable INSTQ1  INSTQ2 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Immigrant share -0.321 -0.717* -0.963**  -0.277** -0.336*** -0.446*** 
 (0.438) (0.367) (0.436)  (0.139) (0.119) (0.129) 
GDP/capita 0.150*** 0.148*** 0.118***  0.037*** 0.036*** 0.029*** 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.023)  (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
Trade openness -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Government size 0.003 0.004 0.003  0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Life expectancy 0.003 0.000 0.003  -0.000 -0.001 -0.002* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Population (log) -0.018 -0.025* -0.036**  -0.008 -0.009* -0.013** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.016)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Urbanization -0.002 -0.001 0.001  -0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Density 0.000 0.000* 0.000  0.000* 0.000** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Oil/gas exporter -0.174*** -0.147*** -0.139***  -0.040*** -0.036*** -0.029** 
 (0.047) (0.044) (0.044)  (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) 
Distance to equator  0.004* 0.003   0.001* 0.000 
  (0.002) (0.002)   (0.001) (0.001) 
Pct. Tropic land  0.054 0.120*   0.032 0.028 
  (0.076) (0.073)   (0.023) (0.021) 
Landlocked  -0.013 0.011   -0.007 -0.008 
  (0.033) (0.037)   (0.009) (0.010) 
“NeoEuropes”   0.302***    0.065* 
   (0.087)    (0.036) 
British colony   0.071    0.034** 
   (0.051)    (0.015) 
French colony   -0.017    -0.003 
   (0.051)    (0.013) 
Africa   0.065    -0.059* 
   (0.073)    (0.031) 
Americas   -0.021    -0.022 
   (0.060)    (0.030) 
Asia   0.101    -0.013 
   (0.092)    (0.036) 
Europe   0.125    0.022 
   (0.096)    (0.038) 
        
Observations 130 130 130  127 127 127 
Adjusted R-squared 0.694 0.682 0.688  0.500 0.488 0.523 
Kleibergen-Paap F-
Test 
17.19 19.19 17.46  16.43 17.27 14.51 
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by country  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1 Heterogeneous effects of immigration on institutional quality 
 
 
Table 4 Immigration and institutional quality, standardized beta coefficients  
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable INST1 INST2 
Immigrant share -0.359 -0.703 
GDP/capita (PPP) 0.685 0.696 
Trade openness -0.048 -0.045 
Government size 0.078 0.101 
Life expectancy 0.114 -0.333 
Population (log) -0.210 -0.295 
Urbanization 0.080 0.222 
Density 0.089 0.097 
Oil/gas exporter -0.175 -0.156 
Distance to equator 0.199 0.117 
Pct. tropic land 0.213 0.206 
Landlocked 0.018 -0.050 
“NeoEuropes” 0.196 0.157 
British colony 0.118 0.230 
French colony -0.024 -0.017 
Africa 0.112 -0.429 
Americas -0.030 -0.134 
Asia 0.166 -0.088 
Europe 0.203 0.148 
   
Observations 130 127 
Adjusted R-squared 0.688 0.523 
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by country *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5 Robustness to the inclusion of further controls  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A INSTQ1      
Immigrant share  -0.789* -0.991** -0.909** -0.216 -0.179 
 (0.442) (0.453) (0.440) (0.505) (0.557) 
Years of schooling 0.001    -0.002 
 (0.009)    (0.007) 
Pct. of Immigrants in 1500   0.078   -0.034 
  (0.095)   (0.098) 
Population density in 1500    -0.003  -0.003 
   (0.012)  (0.011) 
Pct. of Catholics in 1900     0.119** 0.119** 
    (0.058) (0.057) 
Pct. of Protestants in 1900     0.204** 0.210** 
    (0.081) (0.086) 
Pct. of Muslims in 1900    -0.126** -0.128** 
    (0.054) (0.056) 
Observations 115 130 128 115 114 
Adjusted R-squared 0.726 0.685 0.687 0.773 0.764 
Kleibergen-Paap F-Test 15.17 22.88 18.48 11.20 11.09 
Panel B INSTQ2 
Immigrant share  -0.396*** -0.447*** -0.438*** -0.301* -0.264 
 (0.135) (0.130) (0.130) (0.167) (0.175) 
Years of schooling 0.002    0.002 
 (0.003)    (0.002) 
Pct. of Immigrants in 1500   0.008   -0.034 
  (0.028)   (0.030) 
Population density in 1500    -0.002  -0.003 
   (0.003)  (0.003) 
Pct. of Catholics in 1900     0.034** 0.033** 
    (0.016) (0.015) 
Pct. of Protestants in 1900     0.029 0.032 
    (0.022) (0.023) 
Pct. of Muslims in 1900    -0.023 -0.025 
    (0.018) (0.018) 
Observations 112 127 125 112 111 
Adjusted R-squared 0.561 0.518 0.517 0.610 0.616 
Kleibergen-Paap F-Test 12.39 19.99 15.12 9.103 9.811 
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by country  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6 Immigration and institutional quality components, 2SLS estimates 
Panel A INSTQ1 Coeff. St.err 
Corruption -0.965* -0.535 
Effectiveness -0.716 -0.475 
Stability -1.320** -0.575 
Regulatory -0.281 -0.522 
Rule of law -1.036** -0.504 
Voice Accountability -1.462*** -0.558 
Panel B INSTQ2 Coeff. St.err 
Judicial independence -0.500** -0.211 
Checks -0.223 -0.187 
Democracy -0.537** -0.213 
Political terror -0.441** -0.188 
Executive constraint -0.024 -0.119 
Robust standard errors clustered by country in the last column 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel A Dependent variable INSTQ1 
 
Panel B Dependent variable INSTQ2 
 
Figure 1 This figure plots the coefficient on the immigrant share variable and the associated t-
statistics based on 1000 estimations of our main proxy for institutional quality on immigration 
and the full set of the remaining covariates, randomly dropping 10 percent of observations at a 
time from the sample. 
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Table 7 Fractionalization, polarization and institutional quality 
 INSTQ1  INSTQ2 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
Immigrant share -0.825* -0.785   -0.423*** -0.424***  
 (0.451) (0.478)   (0.133) (0.135)  
Fractionalization 0.261**  0.186  0.053  0.030 
 (0.125)  (0.121)  (0.035)  (0.038) 
Polarization  -0.216 -0.269*   -0.044 -0.078 
  (0.149) (0.141)   (0.051) (0.053) 
GDP/capita  0.110*** 0.103*** 0.087***  0.027*** 0.026*** 0.019*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.020)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Trade openness -0.000 0.000 0.000  -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Government  0.006 0.007* 0.002  0.002* 0.002** -0.000 
size (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Life expectancy 0.002 0.003 0.004  -0.002** -0.002** -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Population (log) -0.039*** -0.031* -0.020*  -0.013** -0.012** -0.003 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.012)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Urbanization -0.001 -0.000 -0.002*  0.000 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Density 0.000** 0.000 0.000  0.000** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Oil/gas exporter -0.130*** -0.145*** -0.153***  -0.028** -0.032*** -0.036*** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.039)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Distance to  0.002 0.004* 0.005**  0.000 0.001 0.001** 
equator (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Pct. Tropic land 0.057 0.122* 0.101  0.015 0.028 0.032* 
 (0.079) (0.070) (0.072)  (0.022) (0.021) (0.019) 
Landlocked -0.010 -0.003 -0.000  -0.013 -0.012 -0.008 
 (0.037) (0.035) (0.032)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
“NeoEuropes” 0.325*** 0.282*** 0.198**  0.074** 0.064** 0.011 
 (0.095) (0.092) (0.080)  (0.030) (0.030) (0.024) 
British colony 0.030 -0.007 -0.042  0.022 0.014 -0.006 
 (0.047) (0.056) (0.050)  (0.014) (0.020) (0.019) 
French colony -0.035 -0.050 -0.070*  -0.009 -0.012 -0.024* 
 (0.048) (0.045) (0.041)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
Africa 0.052 0.044 0.003  -0.060*** -0.064*** -0.084*** 
 (0.089) (0.088) (0.079)  (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) 
Americas 0.007 -0.051 -0.085  -0.014 -0.029 -0.052** 
 (0.076) (0.074) (0.069)  (0.023) (0.026) (0.025) 
Asia 0.130 0.044 -0.046  -0.005 -0.024 -0.087*** 
 (0.105) (0.111) (0.089)  (0.030) (0.034) (0.028) 
Europe 0.117 0.016 -0.046  0.018 -0.005 -0.052 
 (0.111) (0.117) (0.116)  (0.032) (0.036) (0.038) 
        
Observations 127 127 127  124 124 124 
R-squared 0.762 0.772 0.782  0.632 0.626 0.647 
Kleibergen-Paap F-
Test 
7.992 7.666 18.23  6.544 6.409 17.23 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix A. Countries analyzed in this study 
 
Country INSTQ1 INSTQ2 Country INSTQ1 INSTQ2
Argentina x x Kenya x x
Armenia x x Kyrgyz Republic x x
Australia x x Korea, Rep. x x
Austria x x Kuwait x x
Azerbaijan x x Lao PDR x x
Burundi x x Libya x x
Belgium x x Sri Lanka x x
Benin x x Lithuania x x
Burkina Faso x x Luxembourg x x
Bangladesh x x Latvia x x
Bulgaria x x Morocco x x
Belarus x x Moldova x x
Belize x Madagascar x x
Bolivia x x Mexico x x
Brazil x x Mali x x
Bhutan x x Mongolia x x
Botswana x x Mozambique x x
Central African Republic x x Mauritania x x
Canada x x Malawi x x
Switzerland x x Malaysia x x
Chile x x Namibia x x
China x x Niger x x
Cote d'Ivoire x x Nigeria x x
Cameroon x x Nicaragua x x
Congo, Rep. x x Netherlands x x
Colombia x x Norway x x
Costa Rica x x Nepal x x
Czech Republic x x New Zealand x x
Germany x x Oman x x
Denmark x x Pakistan x x
Dominican Republic x x Panama x x
Algeria x x Peru x x
Ecuador x x Philippines x x
Egypt, Arab Rep. x x Papua New Guinea x x
Eritrea x x Poland x x
Spain x x Portugal x x
Estonia x x Paraguay x x
Finland x x Qatar x x
France x x Russian Federation x x
Gabon x x Rwanda x x
United Kingdom x x Saudi Arabia x x
Georgia x x Senegal x x
Ghana x x Sierra Leone x x
Guinea x x El Salvador x x
Gambia, The x x Slovak Republic x x
Guinea-Bissau x x Slovenia x x
Greece x x Sweden x x
Guatemala x x Eswatini x x
Guyana x x Chad x x
Honduras x x Togo x x
Croatia x x Thailand x x
Haiti x x Tajikistan x x
Hungary x x Turkmenistan x x
Indonesia x x Tunisia x x
India x x Turkey x x
Ireland x x Tanzania x x
Iran, Islamic Rep. x x Uganda x x
Iraq x x Ukraine x x
Iceland x Uruguay x x
Israel x x United States x
Italy x x Uzbekistan x x
Jamaica x x Venezuela, RB x x
Jordan x x Vietnam x x
Japan x x South Africa x x
Kazakhstan x x Zimbabwe x x
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Appendix B 
 
Panel A Quality of Institutions
 
 
Panel B Immigrant share 
 
Appendix Figure 1 Institutional quality measured by the mean value of the Wordlwide 
Governance Indicators (Panel A) and immigration as a percentage of a country’s population 
(Panel B), Sample averages.  
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Appendix Figure 2. fractionalization vs polarization. Source: Authors’ elaborations on World 
Bank’s bilateral migration matrices. 
 
 
